Metapsychologism In The Philosophy Of Logic Essay -- Philosophy Philos

Metapsychologism In The Philosophy Of Logic ABSTRACT: The problem of psychologism in the philosophy of logic and the different solutions of this problem are considered. Both traditional psychologistic and antipsychologistic solutions are shown to be untenable and the need for a new solution is demonstrated. The original program of metapsychologism is advanced as a solution to the problem of psychologism based on deduction-search theory. Two formalized levels of a logical procedure are distinguished: 1) an object-level at which a notion of inference is formalized; 2) a metalevel at which principles of deduction-search are formalized, and a thesis of metapsychologism according to which metalevel processes are formulated. Metapsychologism lifts usual psychologist considerations one level up in the hierarchy of logical procedure, while a non-psychologist justification of logical relations is kept at the object-level. The application of the thesis of metapsychologism to different concrete logical procedures is considered. "In the old anti-psychologistic days ...". W. van O. Quine. "Epistemology Naturalized" The debate between psychologism and antipsychologism in the XXth century psychology of logic seemed to be solved ultimately in favor of antipsychologism. After G. Frege, E. Husserl, R. Carnap and J. Lukasiewicz it was almost generally recognized that the only true philosophy of symbolic logic is antipsychologism. Antipsychologism was considered as a thesis belonging to the body of symbolic logic itself. In this paper I try to re-examine relations between antipsychologism, psychologism and modern logic. The problem of psychologism The re-examination mentioned presupposes an analysis of notions of psychologism and a... ...ress, 1993. Vol. 1. P. 349-489. (4) S. Haack Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. (5) G. Frege Logik [1897] // Schriften zur Logik und Sprachphilosophie. Aus dem Nachlaß. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990. S. 65. (6) J.A. Robinson, Logic: Form and Function. The Mechanisation of Deductive Reasoning. Edinburgh: Edinburg University Press, 1979. P.93. (7) Ibid. P.94. (8) E. Barth, E. Krabbe, From Axiom to Dialogue: A Philosophical Study of Logic and Argumentation. Berlin, 1982. P. 10-11. (9) Of course in practice we do not use such elaborate constructions. However, if we work with sequential systems, then the existence of an object level system and an opportunity for the translation of the results of a proof-search in sequential calculi into the proofs of a Hilbert type axiomatic or natural system are tacitly presupposed.